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RECO CILI G GE ERIC STRATEGY THEORY A D
STRATEGIC MA AGEME T PRACTICE
Jack Scarborough

The purpose of this paper 1, to suggest that the primary contribuuon of Poner\ ( 1980, 191:15 J
generic strategy theory ma) not be the mandatory choice among generic strategies but, rather, Poner\
propos1uon Ihm finm which pur-ue one generic ,1ra1cgy must be very di! lerent from finm wh1d1 pursue
the other, and that these d1lterences make simultaneous employment ol lo"--COst leader-hip and
d1tlerenua1ion ,·cry difficult. The altcmau,e argument, 1ha1 in our intensely compe1111ve and demand mg
marketplace finm must try to both drive down costs while differenuaung themselves, appc,1r, to be
gammg credence m both academic and prac1111oncr literature. II one accept, the altemauve argument.
then such firms must find "ays to overcome the dllficult1es m rcconc1lmg the various organw111onal
reqmrements, skill\, and resources ol low cost leadership and d11teren11a11on Firms that are able 10 do
so successfull) "111 demonstrate ahovc-,1,erage pcrtonnancc.
Poner's theory has n:ce1vc<l relauvcly little attenuon 111 academic luer,llure m the last le" )Ca~. One
possible explanauon IS th,11 both academ1c1ans and pracuuoner, sense that the 1heor) 1, no longer relev,mt
or 1mponant. The unplicauons ol 1h1S pos\lb1h1y arc \lgnilicant because 1111, theory still ,erves a, the
primary pedagogical construct tor bu\lncss-level s1ra1cg) torrnulation \I) mspcc11on ot t"-ent) l"-O
current strategic management le~ts found that Porter's theory 1s the principal conceptual framework m
all but three and 1, the only tramcwork 1ha1 relates bu,me" stratcg) to compelltl\e ,1ra1eg) Other
lr:imc\\Orks, each pn:sentL'O much Ic,, otten or "'th less empha\ls. mclude Pcar<:c\ ( 1982) grand ,1ratcg)
typology and "vl1Ic, anti Snow', ( 1978) typology ot prospetlOP,, analy1er,. dclendcr, anti reactors.
Moreover, the tc~t, prc,entmg Poner·, model did ,o. mut·h a, Porta did. \\1thou1 addrcssmg the
cruicisms ol Poner', "-Ork. "hich appeared "-llh ,omc regulant) during the last dccatle
Pm1er's model ha., gn:a11111u111,c .ippcal t=ausc. unlike the grand mategy 1ypolog) (Pearle 1982).
the choKes II oller, )icltl a coherent logic and rallllllalc lor lirrn, to determme how they will conduct.
anti succeed 111. compcuuon with otl1cr !inns. This question subsume, dcc1Sion, regard mg the allocauon
and deployment ot resour<:es ,md goes 10 the CS\ence ol strategy lormulauon by ask mg exallly !um a
firm will acl11e,c 11, goals, Investment b,1Setl models do not an,..er 1h1s questmn, Wisc ,1lloc,111on
dc'1sions only create c1rLum,1anLes nmtlucl\c 10 ,urLess. they do 1101 address mailer- related 10
emplo) ment ol re,ourtc, and d1rec1 engagement ot compc111or, .md the marketplace cverthcless,
cru1cs and real \\orld trends have cast doubt on the ,ahd1t) and rcle,ance ol the thCOf)

GENERIC TR ATEG IE : A BRIEF RHI EW
Porter ( 1980) suggested that ,1 finn c.111 achieve abo,e-a,erage return, in 11, mdustry either by
establ1shmg one ot two kinds ot compc1111,c ad,,1n1agc 1.c ach1c\lng lo"-cost leader-hip or
d11tercn11atmg II cit from compc111ors on some d1menS1on ot u1114uencss. orb) tocu,mg 111 a narrow
segment of the market, cmphaS111ng Io" cost, d1ttercn11a11on, or both. For firms compcung
mdustry-w1de. Porter argues that those not clear!) d11tercn11a1ed or 111 a km •cost leader-hip p{)\IIIOn will
tmd them,elvcs "stuck 111 the middle" 111 that the) ,1and 10 lme more price-scns111vc customers 10 the
lower-cost compc111ors and more d1Scrim111a11ng customer, lO the d1ltcrcn11ators and thu, arc likely to
be'™ profitable. Ano1hcrd11ficull} tacmg these finm is that 11 not clearly aligned "-Ith one ol these two
generic s1ratcg1es. each with 11s own re4u1,11c set ol orga1111a11onal rc4u1rcmcnts, ,k111,. and resources.
they will sufler",, . trom a blurred corporate culmrc and a contl1ctmg ,e1 ol orga111za11onal arrangement,

Southern Business Review

-25-

and motivation systems" (Porter, 1980, p. 42). Poner elaborated on his theory by arguing that a low-cost
leader cannot ignore elements of differentiation and. likewise, a differentiator cannot ignore costs.
Rather. the low-cost leader must concern itself with _product acceptability and comparability. achieving
''parity or proximity" on the basis of d1fferent1auon in its industry (Poncr. 1985). Similarly, the
differen11ator must achieve parny with us industry on coses b} reducing costs in ways which do noc
jeopardize its uniqueness. In this lacer fonnulation, Porter reduced the three possibilities for a focus
strategy for firms choosing a narrow compc11t1,e scope to two for Iinn, choosing a low-cost focus or
differentiation focus. Sruck-in-the-m1ddle finm. whecher competing industry wide or in narrow
segments, have no compeuuve advantage and could earn above-average profits only if the industry
conditions were very favorable. Poner holds that tlus \tud.-in-the-m1ddlc pos1t1on 1s the result of a firm
failing to make a dec1s1ve choice about how 11 intend, to compete in 1i- industry. 1.e.. its competicive
strategy A focused firm. as 11 succeeds and grows beyond its niche. becomes pan1cularly suscepuble
to this blumng of strategy.
Porter recognized the value of a llnn having both kinds ol compet111ve advantage but argued that
firms w1U find 1t very difficult to pursue boch s1multancousl\ because clforts 10 d1flerent1ate are usually
costly and efforts to reduce cosLs usually reduce uniqueness. He po,11ed three po,sible conditions under
which a firm might be able to achieve both: (a) when all competitors arc sruck in the middle; (b) when
a firm builds a decisive market share advantage or benefits lrom a uniqucl} ,1dvantageous relat1onsh1p
with another firm: or (c) when a lirm has developed a unique mnovatmn. Porter suggested, however.
that these condrnons were temporary and that !inns in an) ol thc,e ,11ua11on, remain vulnerable 10
competitors who choo,e to pur-.ue one fonn ol compcuuve advantage and .-ho. in doing so. surpas,
one's compeuu, e advantage. The strong and unnmtakablc 1mphcauon here is thac .wrtamable
compe11u,e advantage rest!> on max1m1zing one ot che two tonn, ,ind singlc-minded pum111 of that
genelic strategy while maintaining pancy or prox1m11y on the ocher d1mens1on ol compe1111,e advantage.

Criticism
One likely intu111ve reac11on to Porter\ theory 1s that his cwo tonns of compct111vc adva111age. lo"
co,;t and differenuauon. corre\pond to the two elements ol value mo,t customers weigh in any purchase
decision- plice and qualuy. Therefore. 1t 1s risky to ,enle onl) for parn) or proximity on one ol chose
two elemencs of the customer's value judgment Indeed, much of the criticism ot Porter's cheory cites
example, of successful companies that have achieved and sustained both forms ot compc1111ve
advantage. and iden11fies means for doing so. A number ol studies (Hill. 1988, Jones and Butler. 19 8
Phillips. Chang, and Buzzell, 1983) suggest that dilferent1at1on can improve a finn's cosl pos111on by
increasing 1~ market share. which can reduce its unit costs in 1he long run. Hill cites empirical endence
which sugg~Ls thac this outcome 1scommon and. 1heretore, that Porter's second condicion. noced above.
1s overly restnc11,e. Fine ( 1983) found that costs dedined more rapidly lor finm producing higher
quah1y products. These arguments suggest that Poncr's generic '>lrateg1es are not only not mutually
exclusive, but also are not necessarily incompatible. Murray ( 1988) suggests chat the lci.--cost leader\
need foragenelicorcommod11y-like product is incre,1,ingly irrelevant to the modem markecplacc smcc
there are few such products in demand Therefore the choice ot a lo" -cost leadership strategy to the
exclusion of d1fferent1a11on 1s increasingly less likely to yield compc11t1ve advancage.
Miller (1992) identifies nsk, invol\ed in pur..u11 of one generic strategy. ansing pnmanly lrom a
tendency to concentrate on trying 10 do only a few chings well. Pure strategies can lead to preoccupacion
and overspecializauon which, in tum. can leave gaps in the product hne and leave the finn overexposed
to competitor innovations or oblivious to changing market conditions. For example, an ovemdmg
concern wnh costs can result in shoddy products or an overriding concern with innovation can allow
com to nse out of control. Moreover, he suggests that mixed strategies can have significant benefits.
c11ing Phillips et al. ( 1983) and Deming ( 1982), who maintain that there is complementarity between
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high quality and productivity Miller suggesLs that a pure generic strategy is appropriate only when there
is an overriding customer preference for a single feature or for pnce alone.
Poner(l994)does not appear to be swa)ed by these criticisms. In response to repeated questions
on this issue posed during a recent teleconference produced by the Harvard Business School. he
conceded that finns might snnultaneously improve on both d1mens1ons but. at some point. must choose
between them because certain tradcoll\ bec.:ome inevuable. "It 1s at that point." said Porter. "that real
strategy making begins."

CO'IITEMPORARY PRACTICE
Anecdotal evidence. which support., cnt1c1sm ot Porter's arguement, 1s mounting in the marketplace
at an impressive rate Whether It began with the precedent set by Toyota or by Wal-\'1art, by
category-killer retailers. or by someone else the consumer now demands more value. 1.c . h1gh-quaht)
goods and services at vcrv rnmpct1t1vc prices The general business press abounds wnh articles
descnbing th1sevcr-inore demanding rn,tomer (e.g .. Rice 1992; Sellers. 1990. 199~. Power Konrad.
Cuneo, and Treece, 1991 ). Bu~nc<.!t Weck ('\:o,. I~- 1991) and Fortune (Autumn Winter 1991 spenal
issue) recently de,oted entire 1"ul'' to the topic. Any alert consumer cannot avmd noucing the
impressive unprovcments in product quality and service and greater choice. Olten cKrnmpanied b, an
mcreasmg frequency ol ,aks ,md promotion,. m product alter product. mdustr} after industry The
business press has been tlo,xkd "1th reports ot tinn, struggling to ad,1pt to tlm more demand111g
en\'1ronment Imm Bkximingdale\ attempt to improve service without increasing stall (Agm,. 1992) to
pruned product lme, anti promo11onal expcn,es ,It Procter & Gamble (Schiller. 1991) to Compaq\ tr)
to match D:11 on pnce and service (Burrow,, 1991) to \krcede, Ben, upgr.idmg n, 190 cla" t·,1rs to a
ne" C chss car" 1th no price innca,c (Sum 199.1) r herc arc examples ol finns that ,eem to succeed
ma,hancmg ,tc,1<.111) on hoth , ,1lue d11nension,. ,uch as I lomc Depot. \lucor. Blockhuster and redcr.il
E\pre\\, The chairman and CLO ot Ph1hp \!om,. \ltchael ,\. \hies, t)p11led thl\, IC\\ 111 remark, to
a corporate management conference, alter lclturmg at length on the pnmacy ol prndurt qualit)
Clearl} in th" cnv1ronml'nt, the pnce mcrca,e, that have tln,en the profit gnm th and margin
expansion 111 vmualh all our hu,1nesses 111 the 19!-i0, \\Ill be harder to ,1ch1eve, and ,o. iu,t .1,
cle,irl1 , the need lor mon: pnxlul ti\ It) and ') nerg) to ma111ta111 our prof It .md margin gr0\\ th
"111 be greater in the 1990, ( 1992, p. I 'i ).
The cla,si, economic ,1rgumcnt th.it tinn, \\htch d1tterenti.1te sUllC\\IUII) c.m build ,utiinent
market shan: to ,1d11e,c co,t .1d\CU1t,1gc," ,I pcr,ua,l\e one But 1t .1ppear, that. incre,1,mglv , llnn, mu,t
ofter \'Cry compet1t1,e pnll'' and ,omc unique clement ol qualtt\ trom the out,et ,u,t to h,1,c an
opportunity to build market ,hare
Firm, have responded to th!\ ne" en\lronmcnt 111 ,enou, ,md 1nno,,1u,e \\,I)'· A commonaht)
among these response, 1, that the) seem to a"umc that lim1s must ,tn,e to 1mpro,e on hoth ,aluc
d1mens1on,. quality or umquene" .md prKc. In doing ,o. they also ,eem to ha,e Judged the choice
bet\\een dillerenuation and lo" cost ,1 nwot que,uon. adopt Ill!! what fhompson and Strickland ( 1993)
have called a "be\! co,t" strategv, 1. e. otter the hcst po\\1blc pnxluct ,It the IO\,e,t pO\\thk pnce

Restructuring and Donnsi,ing
One rcspon,e. prcc1p1tated 111 no small way by the .1dvcnt ol global compe11tum "a' d0\,ns111ng
intended not JUSt to reduce overhead, but to 1mpro,e respons1,cnc\\ (Dumaine. 1992) A, ,uch 1t
marked an attempt to advance on both , alue dimension, lower co,t and sa11sfaction ol unique and
volatile customer requirements. llowcver, result\ have been mt'ed. getting smaller i, not neccssanl)
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gemng beuer. One difficulty in downs1zmg is an increase m the need tor coord111a11on, cooperation, and
ieamwork required 10 compensate for !he thinned or elimina1ed laycrs of middle management which had
served Iha! purpose. One resuh has been 1he pronounced movement 10 develop and reinforce strong
corporate culrures as a subs1i1u1e for the bureaucratic oversight and coordma11on responsibilities of
middle managers. Another is a he1gh1ened emphasis on empowerment, self-managed work 1eams, and
mul1idisciplinary management leallls-wha1 has been called the "horizon1al corpora11on" (Byrne, 1993).

Downscoping
Diversified firms have been urged 10 narrow their scopes 10 improve opera11ng synergy and
compelllive advantage and 10 forego 1he search tor elusive financial '>nerg1e, (Drucker, 1991, Jarrel,
1991 ). The proporuon ol smgle-busmcss public corpora11ons m the U S increased Irom 35% in 1978
10 53"1: m 19 . Jarrel ( 1991) found 1ha1 hrms wl11ch narrowed 1he1r ,cop,: exceeded a, erage changes
m market value while firms wluch increased 1he1r scopes lagged behind the average.
All firms have been urged 10 forego conven11onal no11on, ol bu,mes, ,1ra1egy mcludmg Poner's
and, ms1ead. 10 aruculatc a '\tra1eg1c m1en1" simply 10 become 1he bc,1 company m 11s mdustry on a
global scale by dcd1caung 1t-.elt 10 wmnmg compe11me ba11les a1 ,111 level, (H,1mel and Prahalad. 1989).

Renewal and Continuou~ Improvement
S1r:11eg1c 1111ent is made man1les1 m s1mel> stated bu1 d1ll1cuh 10 1mplemcn1, organ111ng pnnc1ples
such as 101al quality management (Jacob, 1993) and rnmpc11ng on capabih11c, based on core
compe1enc1es (Co>ne. 1993. Snyder and Ebeling, 1992 Stalk E,an,. and Shulman, 1992) such as
Wal-Man\ ,ophl\lica1ed commun1ca11ons and log1s11cs systems which reduces cos1 and improves
cus10mer1ervice. Another approach. niass cu,1om11,111on (Pme, 199•. Pme \ 1c1or and Borden. 1993).
surpasses con11nuous 1mprovemen1 lO build sullicien1 llex1b1l11y 11110 prcx-essc, 10 allo" cons1an1
reconligurauon ol proces, modules 10 ~eep pace \\llh ,ola11lc cu\lomer needs. \laS\ c·u,1om1za11on
demands simul1.aneous pursu11 ol both cost reduc11on and d1llercn11a11on well hcyond Por1cr's paruy and
is very much m ~cepmg wnh a s1ra1eg1c m1cn1 10 be 1he be,1 on all d1mcn\lon,. 11 111,1} sol,e the
dichotomy between global and mul1idomcs11c s1ra1egie, in 1n1cma11onal market,, which parallels Poner',
low,os1 d1flcren11a11on d1cho1om} Some firm, arc going ,ts tar as rcbuildm~ 1hc1r core compe1cncie,,
mnova11ng and rede\lgnmg core processes lrom 1hc ground up. Tim has become known as
reengineenng (Hammer and Champ} 199,. S1cwar1. 1993).

De-integration
In add111on 10 narrowing their scopes and 1mpro, mg core compe1cnc1c,. tirm, ,ire shoncnmg 1hc1r
presence m 1he1r produrnon-log1s11cs ac11v11y chams by oul\ourcing ae11,111es 1ha1 (a) do 1101 add
s1gn11ican1 value and1or (bl arc nol ccn1ercd on 1he1r core compe1e1K1es. Extreme cllon, arc bcmg
labeled as "modular''corporatmn, (full}. 1993), or even "v1nual" wrpora11ons. Ex.1111pb mcludc ~i~c
and Reebok. which market alhlcuc shoes but do 1101 produce 1hcm, and Dell Computer. which outsources
all componen1s. These firms do only what 1hcy can do al world clas, ,1andards, and only 1ho,e 1hmgs
lha1 add !he mos1 value 10 !heir products or services. 'vtakmg 1h1S dc1en111na11on amou111s 10 "relrammg"
!he corpora11on, 1.e., defining !he firm\ m1ss1on m term, ol where 11, compc1111vc advantage hes and what
cons111u1es the essence ol linn, whether 11 1s appare111101he customer (Kiernan. 1991). In 1l11s sense.
Wal-Mart's basic business is dl\1nbu11on, no1 re1a1hng (Drucker. 1993, Stalk c1 al.. 1992).
h remams 10 be seen for cenam, bu1 these effom 10 improve compe1111vencss seem 10 be progre,sing
beyond !he stage of managcmen1 tad. Moreover. there appears 10 be a cer1am coherence and cons1s1cncy
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among them . The pattern appears to be one of reducing the number and kmds of things a finn does
while 1mprovmg those thmgs that remam to world-class standards.

RECO CILI G THEORY A D PRACTICE
All \his suggeMs that for compet1t1ve strategy tonnulation finns no longer have a choice between
Iow-rost leadership and d1ffcrcntmt1on. but must pursue both. In other words. Porter's pre,cription that
firms must e~cel on one ot the two value d1mens1ons while only mamtammg parity on the other 1s an
increasingly ns~y one and, therctorc, such ,m approach to strategy fonnulat1on 1s mcreasmgl}
inadequate. It this 1s so, Porter's choice of strategy 1s reduced to nothing more than a choice ot
mdustry-w1de compet111on or focusing on a niche. Based on these trends in busme,s practice. ,1
propos111on can be offered which e~plams this behavior m light ot Porter's model but which. ot course,
requires empirical 1cst1ng.
P,

Firms mcrcasmgly will achieve above-average pertonnance only by s,muhaneously driving
cost, below the mdu\lry average and driving d1ttcrent1at1on above the industry average.

In ettect. !inns arc deprived ot the option b<!tY.een loY. cost leadership and dittcrent1a1ion. They
must do both. Yet. a.s reported earlier. most strategic management texts otter the Porter typology as the
pnnc1pal model tor strategy tormulauon at the busme.,s level. without elaboration ot 11s Y.ea~nes,es Ilo"
then can theory be reconciled with practice·>
Porter ( 1980. pp. 40 41 J argued that tinm -.ould !ind II d1fficul1 to pursue both tonn, ot
compet1t1'e ath antage m pan because each has a requ1,11c set ot s~ilb. resource,. and orgamLJuonat
requirements that -.ould be very d1tticult to mtegrate They include
Lo\\-Cost Leadership
High capital m,e,1ment
Process engmccnng ,~111\
l111emc superv1s1on
Product, deS1gned tor case m manutatturc
Low cost d1,tnbutum

Tight cost control
Frequent. detailed control reports
Structured organization and responsibilities
lncenu,es based on meetmg strict quantitative
targets

D1tleren11a11on
Strong mar~etmg si--111,
Product engmecnng s~1lls
Creative flair
Strong basic R&D ,I--111,
Strong reput,111011 tor qual1t}
or technolog1cal leadership

Long tr.1dit1nn
Strong cooperation trom channels
Strong coonlmat1on among tunctmns
SubJec11,e me,1,urements and mccnmes
Amcm11c, to at1rac1 h1ghl~ skilled people
Opcra1111g synergy with other bu,messe,

Clearly many ot these charae1ens11cs would be d1tticult 10 achieve ,nnultaneously Yet 1! tirm,
must develop both tonns ol compet1tl\C .id,antagc. then II appears th,11 that" preusel~ what they must
do. Moreover. the cum:nt trends 111 management suggest that thl\ "e"1c1ly what !inn, are try mg 10 do.
Fmm are trymg 10 build more highly developed ,~dis and trymg to ach,e,e better coord111at1on aero"
them. They are wor~mg with channel panne~ to dme do"n costs and dme up service qual1ty by
bu1ldmg long rclauonships The} arc tlattenmg their structure, to reduce overhead and product
development cycles. They are becommg more flexible and rcsponStve through CAD CAM and
concurrent engmccnng. Most sigmhcantly. they arc employmg these techniques and others to reduce
or hold prices while nnprovmg quality. In other words, 11 can and 1s bemg done. TI1eretore, given P1

Southern Busmess Re1•iew

-29-

p,

Finns will achieve above-average returns to the extent they integrate successfully the skills,
resources, and requirements of low-cost leadership and differentiation.

Another element that seems common 10 ongoing clfons to improve compe1111veness is that all have
something to do wuh simplifying the business. whether b) downsi11ng. downscoping, articulatmg a
unifying strategic intent. centering on one or a few core competencies. or de-m1cgrat1ng. Simplification
not only affords a bener chance to anam a world-cla,, standard through init1at1ves such as total quality
management, reengmeenng. and mass cus1omi.w1ion but. seemingly. reduces the d1llicuhy of integrating
differentiation and low-cost leadership. TI1eretore
P,

Firms will be bener able 10 integrate the requirements ot kiw-cost leadership and
d1fferen11ation 10 the extent they locus their el Ions on aw,1t1es in which value 1s added and
in which core competencies exist or can be de,eloped

An example ol the po"er ol simphficat1on is the "category killer" retailer "ho can offer the d1\Coun1
pnces associated with high volume and, by locusmg on a category ot product such as hardware or
electronics. can develop the same 1,.ind ol 1,.no\\ledgcable sale, ,1.111 and good ,en ice a customer \\Ould
expect to find in a neighborhood shop or boutique
II this set ot propositions proves ,ahd. n ,hilts the balance ol importance between strategy
formulation and strnteg} 1mplementa11on to" ard the lancr, and the choice of strategy then become, less
significant than the execution ol strategy Th" po"1bil11y suggc,I'> another proposn1on.
P,

Firms which perform abo,e industry norms do so pnmanly bec,1u,e ol superior strateg)
execution, not lormulat1on.

This propos1uon 1s consistent "'Ith the example ol finm "'h1rh dc1mmstra11: sU',ta1ned above-average
performance. such as McDonald\, Rubbermaid and Toyota. whose strategics not on1 1 seem relauvely
straightforward but which also seem 10 d1lter hnlc from their perpetual runner, up. One pos"ble
explanauon 1s superiority ol execution. Egclholt ( l99~) remind, us tlhll Japane,e llrms generally tal..e
this same approach, the} tend to empha,11e excellence ol execution o,cr u1114uenc,s or cleverness ol
strategic lommlations. Rather. he say,, Japane,c tinm d1ller lntle from one another m the content ol
their ,crateg1e, but compete pnmaril) on ,upcnor implementation. Clear!}. Jap.mcsc Imm, more so than
U.S. lirm,. seem 10 have mastered the challenge ol turning out ,uperior pnxlucts ,11 highly compeu11vc
cosL,. It 1s probabi> no coincidence then that man) ol the 1cdm14uc, L. S. firm, are employ mg in pursuit
of both quality and co,1 advantages. enumerated above, have their root, 111 Japanese prawces such a,
ka,~,·n consensus decision mal..mg. and mutuall) bcncllc1al. long-term rd,111on,h1p, "'1th channel
panners.
Ho"' does a lirm anacl,. this seemmgl) un,1ruc1ured problem of marr)mg the t"o form, of
compeuuve advantage·> Porter suggested that Imm must achieve compc111ivc advantage on one
dimen,1on, then ad,ancc on the other unul parity 1s reached. in ways "hich do not Jeopard11e the
established advantage. The preM:nt argument suggc,1, that tinns approach the problem in the same way.
but must impro,e on the second d1mensmn bewmd panty. Wal \fan, wnh "ell-established cost
advantages, adds 4uahty m low-cost ways such a, the greeter at the door. an emphasis on U.S.-made and
"green" products, and promotion of the "Every Da} Low Pnces" theme which assures consumer, the)
can always expect good value at Wal-Man. In eltcct. Wal-Man has dilfercnt1ated its image from 11s
compc111ors while s1muhaneously beat1ng them on costs. Thus.
P,
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This proposnion. 11 found valid. provides a conceptual basis by which the pracutioner can begm
to attack the problem ot mtcgratmg dichotomous organizational charJctenstics and requirements. It
suggestS that pracmioners adapt one ot Porter\ sets a, the primary constellauon of organizauonal dc\lgn
elements consistent with 1Ls pnmary generic strategy choice. establish superiority on that d1mens1on. and
then incorporate elements ot the other con,tellation at the margin unul industry parity 1s exceeded on
both dimensions.

l:\1PLICATION
This set ot proposiuons establishes a linl-. between generic strategy theory and current
compeuuveness practices. It remains to he tested but. 11 tound to be valid. moves u, tm,ard an
cxplanauon ot bu,mess bchavmrrnn\lstent '-'llh the predominant model ot rnmpeuuve ,tr.uegy It also
suggests that Poncr's pnmaJ) theon:til'al contributions may he more in hi\ idenuficauon of the obstadcs
to simultaneous pursuit of hm -cost leadership and ditlercnuauon th,m in the cxdu\l,1t) of generic
strategies. even though that remains hi, t>cst known and most discussed contnbuuon.
Another implit-ation is that the richest source ot potenual improvement m the re,c.irch and
pedagogy ofbusmess-level str.uegy hes m irnplementat1on, not t1,rrnula11on. Of particular mtere,t m th1'
reganl is the mtegrauon ot tuncuon,. Current trends 111 1mprm mg competm,ene" ,eem to deal hea, 11,
"1th max1mwng the pertonnance ol functional m.magernent, 1.e m identity mg and ,mpro, mg core
competencies. One core competency which rcrnam, m the strategic management domam is
"Recogni,ing interdependencies and ach1ev111g etlccuvc coordination and mtegr,nion
,u.11 to
attammg ,usliunable compct1t1,e .1d,,111tagc" (lxss and \hller. 199.\ p. 24-l) This need is nothmg nc"
tor us. "e learned ot 1t trorn Thompson, !\1,irch. Sunon Cyert and many other,.
Strategic managers seem to he n:tummg to fundamentals. to the basics nl producing umque or high
qua lit) products and ,crv ice, "h1lc conta111111g or dnvmg down co,t,. Strategy forrnulauon at the
business level seem, to he becoming a matter ot accept mg the ncressny tor \lmultaneou, d1tteren11,111on
and cost reduction w11h strategit· chrnce. a, in Poner\ tr.1mcwork, thu, reduced to choice ot
1cope-mche or broad marl-.et. Thi\ ,ugge,l\ a shill 111 emphasis lrom strateg1 lormulauon to
1mplementa11on. as demon,trJted b) current practice \\h1ch increa,mgl) employ, the terhmque,
discussed above We need to understand thc,c phenomena better 111 order to tult1II our obhgat10n, to
practitioners Spec1llc ,l\enue, ol empmcal 1mest1gation might mdu<le
Do tirrn, pursuing .1 paruwlar gcnenc stratcg) cmplo) the org.11111a11onal si-.11 I,. resource, and
requirements pre,u1bcd b) Poncr tor that str.ucgy~

b employment ot thc,e technique, a\\ou.ued with at,o,e-a,erage pertorrn.mce?

Arc tmns "'th abo,e .1,crage pertom1,m.:c pursuing lo" ,o,t lc.1dcr,h1p and d1ltercn11a11on
strategies sunultancousl} ·>
Are such tirrns employing both sets ot Porter's reqm,11e org.m11a11onal ,l-.111,. resource, and
requ1reme111s·>
Ho" arc such tirrn, rcconc1hng the dichotomy bet\\cen the two set, ot techniques·>
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